Reverse Discrimination Claims No Longer Require Heightened Burden of Proof Following Recent Supreme Court Decision

On June 5, 2025, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that majority-group plaintiffs are not required to meet a higher standard of proof when alleging a claim of “reverse discrimination” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Prior to this decision, the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits required a plaintiff to show “background circumstances” that their employer was an “unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” This heightened evidentiary standard was required in addition to the other elements of a typical disparate-treatment claim when such a claim was brought by a majority-group member. It was not required for plaintiffs alleging discrimination if they were members of a minority group. This decision settles what was previously a circuit split and allows all plaintiffs to bring claims of discrimination without a showing of the additional “background circumstances” element – making the standard the same for all plaintiffs, regardless of their membership in a protected majority or minority class.

Factual and Procedural Background of Ms. Ames’ Litigation

Plaintiff Marlean Ames sued the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“Department”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging she was discriminated against based on her sexual orientation and gender. As the Court noted, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act states that it is unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” (emphasis added). Ms. Ames, a straight, white woman, claimed she was denied a promotion based on her sex and sexual orientation and was ultimately demoted in favor of gay employees.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. Upon appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the principal issue of whether Ms. Ames made the required showing of “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the [Department] is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”  Such a showing was required in addition to the typical prima facie elements of employment discrimination claims, which the Sixth Circuit noted that Ms. Ames satisfied.  Regarding the additional element, the Sixth Circuit held that Ms. Ames failed to show either that the employment decisions at issue were made by the relevant minority group (here, gay employees) or that there was statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination against straight people. The Sixth Circuit also noted that the Department provided nondiscriminatory reasons for her demotion. As a result, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court.

The Supreme Court Decision and Discrimination Claims Moving Forward

Ms. Ames appealed. The United States Supreme Court noted that a prima facie claim of discrimination requires that a plaintiff show they applied for a position for which they were qualified, but were rejected under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. As the Sixth Circuit noted, Ms. Ames satisfied this standard. The Court was then left to consider whether Ms. Ames was required to make the additional showing of “background circumstances.” The Court held that such a requirement is not consistent with Title VII, vacating the previous holding and remanding the matter for further proceedings.

The Court pointed out that the text of Title VII makes no distinction between majority and minority groups.  Rather, the language is written to reflect the protection of the individual. Previous case law also highlighted that discriminatory preference toward any minority or majority group is prohibited. As a result, the “background circumstances” element required by some courts was in direct opposition to those previous holdings and the text of Title VII. The Court also noted that applying the “background circumstances” rule leads to the rigid requirement that only majority-group plaintiffs produce certain evidence that would otherwise not be required. For example, the Sixth Circuit explicitly held that because Ms. Ames was straight, and therefore a member of the majority group, she was required to make additional showings that would otherwise not be required by a member of a minority group. Such a requirement in and of itself is discriminatory towards a particular group and further highlights the tension between the rule and the goal of Title VII in protecting all individuals from discriminatory employment practices.

Justice Thomas also noted in his concurring opinion that defining a “majority group” poses difficulties of its own. He highlighted that no court has decided whether minority status could have a regional or local meaning. For example, women make up the majority of the United States as a whole, but are not the majority in certain states, counties, or certain industries. Racial categories are similarly becoming more difficult to define as families and communities have become increasingly multicultural.

As a result, the “background circumstances” element is no longer required to prove a claim of employment discrimination. This means that moving forward, those thought of traditionally as members of a majority group will be able to bring a discrimination claim by satisfying the typical framework without the additional evidentiary burden. So long as a plaintiff can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they applied for a position for which they were qualified, and the employer rejected them under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, the prima facie case of discrimination has been satisfied.

Kelli P. Lieurance
Sam Harres, Summer Associate